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Access to the Courts: An Essay for the Georgetown
University Law Center Conference on the
Independence of the Courts
DAVIDS. UDELL AND REBEKAH DILLER*
ABSTRACT

In this Essay, we argue that the gap between Americas promise of equal justice and the
reality of justice on the ground is substantial, and growing. Meaningful access to the
courts-consisting of representation by counsel, the ability to physically enter court and
understand and participate in the proceedings, and the opportunity to have claims heard-is
increasingly out of reach for many Americans. First, there are not enough lawyers
available to represent /ow-income people in civil legal matters, resulting in four-fifths of
the civil legal needs of low-income individuals going unmet. Second, in the criminal justice
system, where the right to counsel for the indigent is constitutionally guaranteed, attorneys
are commonly underpaid, under-supervised, under-resourced and, ultimately, unable to
provide effective representation. Third, for people with physical or psychiatric disabilities,
court buildings and court procedures pose obstacles that may be insumwuntable. Fourth,
for people with limited English proficiency, the lack of translation and interpreting services
in many of the nations courts also poses barriers that are often overwhelming. Fifth, the
role of the courts is increasingly circumscribed by laws and by court decisions that
eliminate whole categories of claims from the courts' jurisdiction. Sixth, increased and
often mandatory reliance on alternative dispute resolution has placed judicial review out of
reach for an increasing number of people. These six factors, we argue, daily threaten the
ability of our courts to perform their essential functions: providing predictable and fair
dispute resolution, acting as a check on the legislative and executive branches, protecting
the most vulnerable from the excesses of majoritarianism, and reaffirming the citizenrys
faith in the legitimacy of the courts and of government in general. Finally, we conclude by
offering a set of policy solutions aimed at stabilizing our courts, promoting their independence, and fulfilling the promise of equal justice.
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METHODS RAISES NEW CONCERNS

INTRODUCTION

Our nation's promise of "equal justice for all" is among its proudest traditions. American courts afford a forum for individuals to settle disputes in a civil
manner, under the rule of law. Courts ensure predictability so that individuals
and businesses can tailor their actions accordingly; contracts, for example, are
binding because courts exist to enforce them. In our tripartite system of
government, courts act as a check on the ability of the legislative and executive
branches to accumulate excessive power. They protect the most vulnerable
among us and curb the excesses of majoritarianism. Finally, courts reaffirm the
citizenry's faith in the equal application of the laws and thus in the legitimacy of
government in general.
In order for "equal justice for all" to be more than a hollow promise, people
require access to the courts that is meaningful, with representation by qualified
counsel; the opportunity to physically enter the court and to understand and to
participate in the proceedings; and the assurance that their claims will be heard
by a fair and capable decisionmaker and decided pursuant to the rule of law. Yet
these features of meaningful access to the courts are increasingly absent. The
gap between the promise of equal justice and the reality of justice on the ground
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is substantial, and growing, for the following reasons:
• There are not enough lawyers available to represent low-income
people in civil legal matters. As one scholar has noted, "[a]ccording
to most estimates, about four-fifths of the civil legal needs of lowincome individuals, and two- to three-fifths of the needs of middleincome individuals remain unmet." 1
• In the criminal law context, where counsel is guaranteed by the
Supreme Court's 1963 landmark Gideon v. Wainwright2 decision, the
promise has gone unfulfilled. Counsel for the indigent is commonly
underpaid, under-supervised, under-resourced and, ultimately, unable
to provide effective representation.
• For people with physical or psychiatric disabilities, court buildings
and court procedures pose barriers that may be insurmountable.
• For people with limited English proficiency, the lack of translation
and interpreting services in many of the nation's courts also can be
insurmountable.
• The role of the courts is increasingly circumscribed by laws and by
court decisions that eliminate whole categories of claims from the
courts' jurisdiction.
• Increased and often mandatory reliance on alternative dispute resolution has placed judicial review out of reach for an increasing number
of people.
To be sure, more lawyers and more litigation are not necessarily desirable
ends. Anyone who has ever been involved in litigation is aware of its limitations-the expense, the complexity, the delay, and the ways in which human
concerns can be filtered out of the process. Rising caseloads counsel against the
creation of yet more grounds for lawsuits. We need our public institutions and
our courts to require less, rather than more, reliance on lawyers. Long-term
goals for reform must include simplifying access and promoting fair alternative
dispute resolution systems, not just providing a lawyer to everyone or making
more cases litigable.
But the opportunity to resolve disputes within a court pursuant to the rule of
law remains essential in a broad range of matters involving the concerns of
low-income individuals. Just as a person of substantial means would never
dream of buying a home or seeking a divorce without consulting a lawyer,
persons of modest means likewise enter into life-altering transactions for which
consultation with counsel is essential. For people of limited financial means,
access to an attorney can be the difference between losing a home or keeping it,

I. Deborah Rhode, Access to Justice: Connecting Principles to Practice, 17
369, 371 (2004).
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).

GEO.
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suffering from domestic violence or finding refuge, succumbing to illness or
obtaining a cure, remaining hungry or securing food, or languishing in prison or
reuniting with family and community.
The judiciary is often the only institution situated to resolve civil disputes.
Indeed, it is the unique guardian of individuals' civil legal rights against
excessive assertions of power by the executive and legislative branches. As
decisions related to the War on Terror have demonstrated yet again, the courts
can and do function as an essential bulwark of liberty-affording those accused
of the worst crimes their only opportunity to establish their innocence and
acting as a check on overreaching by the executive branch.
As we demonstrate below, for far too many people, access to the courts is
illusory. Meaningful access to the courts consists of several elements. Chief
among them in our adversarial system of justice is access to an attorney who
can vigorously represent her client. Because courts rely upon a presentation of
the issues and facts by each side's lawyers to reach a decision, lopsided justice
results when one side is unrepresented. Moreover, even when they are paid for
by the government, lawyers for low-income individuals must have the full range
of legal tools available to any other lawyer, lest the functioning of the court
system be warped. Public defenders must be adequately funded to mount
aggressive defenses, lest representation be reduced to the mere appearance
thereof.
Of course, even access to a lawyer is of limited value when an individual is
unable to enter the courthouse or understand the proceedings. For our system to
deliver justice, courts must be accessible to persons with disabilities. Also,
individuals with limited English proficiency must be able to obtain translation
services. Finally, the courts themselves must actually possess the power to hear
the claims presented to them. When courts are stripped of jurisdiction over
certain types of claims, individual rights cannot be vindicated. Moreover, when
the jurisdiction-stripping is the product of legislative or executive overreach, the
delicate balance of power among the three branches of government is disturbed.
As a result, individuals, society, the courts, and the promise of equal justice
suffer.

I.

MOST Low-INCOME INDIVIDUALS CANNOT OBTAIN COUNSEL IN CIVIL MATTERS

Nearly three decades ago, President Jimmy Carter observed: "Ninety percent
of our lawyers serve ten percent of our people. We are overlawyered and
underrepresented." 3 Concern for equal justice is shared across the political
spectrum. In 1995, Senator Peter Domenici (R-NM) declared on the Senate
floor, "I do not know what is wrong with the United States of America saying to
the needy people of this country that the judicial system is not only for the rich.

3. Rhode, supra note 1, at 371 (quoting President James E. Carter, Remarks at the 100th Anniversary
Luncheon of the Los Angeles County Bar Association (May 4, 1978), in 64 A.B.A. J. 840, 842 (1978)).
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What is wrong with that? ... That is what America is all about."4 A decade
later, the National Association of Evangelicals, the nation's largest association
of evangelical Christians, echoed these concerns in a letter to several congressional leaders: "Without a helping hand from legal aid programs and the shared
blessings of others, low-income families too often have no place else to tum for
help .... God measures societies by how they treat the people at the bottom, and
He teaches us to care for the poor and oppressed among us. " 5
Yet notwithstanding widespread acknowledgment of the problem, the crisis
of representation for low-income people in civil cases persists, and grows
worse, because of chronic funding shortages, state and federal restrictions,
shortfalls in pro bono help, and a rollback of financial incentives for attorneys in
private practice to bring critical cases.
The major source of funding in the United States for legal aid in civil matters
is the federal Legal Services Corporation (LSC), established by federal law in
1974. 6 The value in real dollars of the funding appropriated by Congress to LSC
has declined dramatically over the last twenty-five years. In fiscal year 1981,
Congress allocated $321.3 million to LSC, which at the time was seen as the
level sufficient to provide a minimum level of access to legal aid in every
county, although not enough to actually meet all the serious legal needs of
low-income people. 7 Adjusted for inflation, this "minimum access" level of
funding would need to be about $687.1 million in 2005 dollars; yet Congress's
LSC allocation for fiscal 2006 was a mere $326.5 million. 8 On average, every
legal aid attorney, funded by LSC and other sources, serves 6861 people. In
contrast, there is one private attorney for every 525 people in the general
population. 9
The dramatic nature of the funding shortfall becomes even more apparent
when U.S. legal aid funding is compared to that of other industrial democracies, many of which spend at least twice as much per capita on legal aid, if
not more. For example, during fiscal year 1998, combined federal, state, and
local government funding for civil legal services for the poor in the United
States was $600 million, or $2.25 per capita. 10 In contrast, England spends
eleven times as much per capita on civil legal services, at $26.00 per person;
the Netherlands spends four times as much, at $9.70 per person; and
Germany and France spend at least twice as much, at $4.86 and $4.50 per

4. 141 CoNG. REc. S14573-O2, S14587 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1995) (statement of Sen. Domenici).
5. Letter from Rev. Richard Cizik, Vice President for Governmental Affairs, Nat'! Ass 'n of Evangelicals, to Rep. Frank R. Wolf and Rep. Alan B. Mollohan (July 13, 2006) (on file with the Brennan Center
for Justice).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2996b (2000).
7. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING 11iE JUSTICE GAP 1N AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL
NEEDS OF Low-INCOME AMERICANS 2 (2005).
8. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., BUDGET REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2007, at 2 (2006).
9. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 7, at 18.
IO. Justice Earl Johnson, Jr., Equal Access to Justice: Comparing Access to Justice in the United
States and Other Industrial Democracies, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S83, S95 (2000).
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person, respectively. 11
As a result of money shortfalls, in 2004 LSC-funded programs turned away at
least one person seeking help for each person served. 12 This means that
approximately one million cases per year are turned away due to lack of
funding. 13 As striking as these figures are, they understate the real number of
low-income people who go unserved because they do not include those who do
not seek out help, those who were turned away from non-LSC-funded legal aid
providers, or those who received limited advice but required full representation.
In addition to these consequences of funding shortages, the ability of legal aid
programs to serve the poor is further impeded by harsh and wasteful federal
restrictions imposed by Congress in 1996. These restrictions cut deeply into
low-income people's capacity to secure meaningful access to the courts. First,
Congress restricted the legal tools that LSC-funded lawyers could use to
represent their clients, prohibiting them from: representing clients in bringing
class actions; seeking court-ordered attorneys' fee awards; educating potential
clients about their rights and then offering to represent them; and communicating with policymakers or legislators on a client's behalf, except under very
narrow circumstances. 14
Second, Congress limited the categories of clients whom LSC-funded programs could represent, prohibiting representation of certain categories of
legal immigrants as well as all undocumented immigrants, people in prison,
and those charged with illegal drug possession in public housing eviction
proceedings. 15
Finally, Congress imposed an extraordinarily harsh and largely unprecedented limitation on LSC-funded programs: it extended these prohibitions to
the non-LSC-funded activities of legal aid programs. As a result, nearly $390
million in state, local, and private funding for legal aid is restricted under the
same terms as the LSC funds. 16 Faced with a court ruling that such a sweeping
restriction on private funds violates the First Amendment, LSC issued a regulation that theoretically provides an opportunity for non-profits receiving LSC
funds to spend their private money free of these substantive restrictions. 17
Under LSC's "program integrity" regulation, the only way a legal aid non-profit
and its private donors may free themselves of the federal restrictions is to divert
private funds from direct client service in order to establish a separate program-

11. Id.
12. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 7, at 5.
13. Id.
14. See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§ 504(a), 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-53 to -56. Congress has carried forward these restrictions each year, with
minor modifications, by incorporating them in the annual appropriations rider for LSC.
15. See id. at 1321-55 to -56.
16. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., FACT BooK 2005, at 9-10 (2006), available at http://www.rin.lsc.gov/
Rinboard/2005FactBook.pdf.
17. See Use of Non-LSC Funds, Transfers of LSC Funds, Program Integrity, 62 Fed. Reg. 27,695,
27,695 (May 21, 1997) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 1610 (2005)).
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with physically separate staff, offices, and equipment. 18 However, this physical
separation requirement is so burdensome and wasteful that virtually no program
in the country has been able to comply.
Apart from the restrictions and funding shortages, the reach of LSC-funded
programs is inherently limited by their mandate to serve those in the most dire
need. To be eligible for assistance from LSC recipient programs, clients must
earn less than 125% of the Federal Poverty Guidelines. 19 In real terms, a family
of four living in the forty-eight contiguous states with a household income that
exceeds $25,000 is ineligible for assistance from LSC-funded programs. 20 Asset
ceilings also apply.
Thus, many working poor and middle-income families find themselves in a
bind when they have a legal problem. A study commissioned by the American
Bar Association (ABA) and issued in 1994 found that about one-half of
moderate-income households at any given time face a problem that could be
addressed by the courts. 21 However, with the exception of family law matters
such as divorce, the usual course of action for such households was to try to
handle the situation on their own, without a lawyer. 22 Middle-income families
also lack one of the advantages businesses have in being able to afford lawyers:
while legal fees are tax deductible when incurred as a business expense, they
are not when incurred for personal reasons. 23
Pro bono-free or reduced-fee legal assistance by private law firmsprovides some relief. Yet notwithstanding the considerable resources of major
law firms and the sheer number of attorneys in the United States, pro bono
practice falls far short of meeting the legal needs of America's low- and
middle-income families. Pro bono participation is quite low. The average
attorney donates less than a half-hour per week to pro bono service, and
financial contributions average less than fifty cents per day. 24 Less than onethird of the nation's major law firms meet the ABA's pro bono challenge of
donating three to five percent of total revenues. 25 Moreover, a substantial
proportion of pro bono service is done for family or friends, not for low-income

18. See 45 C.F.R. § 1610.8 (2005).
19. See 45 C.F.R. § 161 l.3(c)(l) (2005).
20. See 45 C.F.R. § 1611 app. A (2005).
21. ROY w. REESE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED, ThMPLE UNIV. INST. FOR SURVEY RESEARCH, LEGAL NEEDS
AMONG Low-INCOME AND MODERATE-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS: SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FROM THE COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 8 (1994).
22. Id. at 2 I.
23. See I.R.C. § 162(a) (Supp. 2006) (allowing deduction of all "ordinary and necessary expenses"
incurred in the course of business); Comm'r v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 690-91 (1966) (holding that
litigation expenses for an underwriter's defense of a criminal prosecution for securities fraud were
deductible under section 162(a)); Gilliam v. Comm'r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 515 (1986) (holding that
litigation expenses growing out of an artist's defense of a civil tort claim were personal and not
deductible under section 162(a) even though the underlying events took place on a business trip).
24. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 17 (2004).
25. Id. The ABA Model Rules on Professional Conduct establish an aspiration that lawyers will
"render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal services per year," a "substantial majority" of
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communities. 26 Fewer than one in ten attorneys accept referrals from legal
services programs or other organizations that serve the legal needs of lowincome communities. 27
A recent rollback in the availability of attorneys' fees further threatens the
ability of those who have suffered civil rights violations to bring claims. In an
effort to ensure that attorneys are available to bring cases under laws designed
to vindicate civil rights and deter government wrongdoing, Congress has authorized successful civil rights claimants suing under certain statutes to have their
attorneys' fees paid for by their opponents. 28 However, the courts recently have
narrowed the circumstances under which parties will be deemed to have won
such cases and thus be eligible to collect an attorneys' fee award.
In the past, plaintiffs could collect a fee award when their lawsuits served as a
"catalyst" for legislative or policy change that resolved the dispute, even if the
plaintiffs never formally "won" in court. However, a 2001 Supreme Court
decision, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of
Health and Human Services, 29 restricted the definition of "prevailing party"
under two federal civil rights statutes to only those claimants who achieved
some sort of official judicial recognition of their "victory" to recover fees. 30
Since Buckhannon, most of the intermediate federal appeals courts have interpreted the holding broadly to apply to all civil rights statutes that contain the
same "prevailing party" language at issue in Bukhannnon. 31 Similarly, a number

which should be without fee to low-income communities. MODEL RULES OF P1mr'L CONDUCT R. 6.1
(2002). However, Rule 6.1 is non-binding.
26. See RHODE, supra note 24, at 17.
27. Id.
28. Suits under Titles II, VI, and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are covered by fee-shifting
statutes, see 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2000), as are suits under the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1973l(e) (2000), amended by Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King
Voting Rights Act Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577.
Similarly, the Equal Access to Justice Act awards attorneys' fees against the government in all cases
where, under the common law, attorneys' fees would be awarded between private parties and to a
"prevailing party" in any action brought by or against the United States "unless the court finds that the
position of the United States was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award
unjust." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(b), (d)(l)(A) (2000).
29. 532 U.S. 598 (2001).
30. Id. at 603.
31. See Pamela S. Karlan, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture in Civil Rights and Civil Liberties at
the University of Illinois College of Law (Apr. 1, 2002), reprinted as Disarming the Private Attorney
General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REv. 183, 187-88, 205--08 (noting that the catalyst theory has been eliminated
from prevailing party discussions in most federal statutes); Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory
Meets the Supreme Court-Common Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REv. 973, 993-98 nn.198-244
(2002) (listing appeals court cases applying Buckhannon's prevailing party reasoning to reject fee
applications premised on catalyst theory). Buckhannon has also been relied upon to limit recovery
under the Equal Access to Justice Act. See Goldstein v. Moatz, 445 F.3d 747, 751 (4th Cir. 2006); Select
Milk Producers, Inc. v. Johanns, 400 F.3d 939, 944 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 358 F.3d
20, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2004); Scherer v. United States, 88 Fed. App'x 316, 320 (10th Cir. 2004); Pres.
Coalition v. Fed. Transit Admin., 356 F.3d 444, 452 (2d Cir. 2004); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v.
United States, 288 F.3d 1371 , 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791 , 793-94
(9th Cir. 2002).
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of state courts have relied on Buckhannon to restrict the definition of "prevailing party" under state fee-shifting provisions. 32 As a result, attorneys have
fewer incentives to bring cases that not only vindicate the rights of individuals
but also further the societal goals of deterring discrimination and government
abuse of power.
The shortage of legal assistance that results from all these factors can have
devastating consequences for low-income people. Perhaps nowhere can the impact of
legal assistance be seen more dramatically than in the context of domestic violence
cases. Take, for example, the case of Mariella Batista, a Cuban immigrant who had
suffered for years from domestic violence by an abusive partner. Ten years ago,
Batista sought help from a local legal services program. Even though she feared for
her life, the program had to turn her away due to the 1996 LSC restriction that
prohibited representation of most immigrants. The next week, Batista was killed by
her abuser outside the family court building. 33
Although Congress has since amended the LSC restrictions to allow for
representation of domestic violence victims regardless of immigration status, 34
the lesson persists: denial of access to a lawyer can have tragic consequences. In
contrast, when legal services are made available, survivors of domestic violence
have assistance obtaining protective orders, custody of their children, child
support, and sometimes public assistance. Legal services programs help women
achieve physical safety and financial security and thus empower them to leave their
abusers. In fact, one recent study found that access to legal services was one of the
primary factors contributing to a twenty-one percent decrease nationally in the reported incidence of domestic violence between 1993 and 1998.35
The consequences of inadequate access to the courts affect not just the
individuals directly involved, but also society at large. When families are
evicted from their homes because they cannot obtain counsel in a housing

32. See Annabelle Chan, Comment, The Buckhannon Stops Here: Buckhannon Board & Care
Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Services Should Not Apply to the New
York Equal Access to Justice Act, 72 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1341, 1364-65 (2004) (citing Taylor v. Lenoir,
558 S.E.2d 242, 249 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (applying Buckhannon interpretation to North Carolina
common fund doctrine) and Wallerstein v. Stew Leonard's Dairy, 780 A.2d 916, 919 (Conn. 2001)
(applying Buckhannon interpretation of "prevailing party" to state product liability fee-shifting provision)); see also Tibbetts v. Sight n' Sound Appliance Ctrs., Inc., 77 P.3d 1042, 1052 (Okla. 2003)
(applying Buckhannon interpretation to state consumer protection fee-shifting provision); Direct Action
for Rights & Equality v. Gannon, 819 A.2d 651,660 (R.I. 2003) (applying Buckhannon interpretation to
state access to public records fee-shifting provision). But see DeSalvo v. Bryant, 42 P.3d 525, 530
(Alaska 2002) (noting that the catalyst theory may still apply to state statutes despite Buckhannon);
Graham v. DairnlerChrysler Corp., No. Bl52928, 2002 WL 31732556, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6,
2002) (holding that a California fee-shifting statute was not affected by Buckhannon).
33. See Leslye Orloff et al., Opening a Door to Help: Legal Services Programs' Key Role in
Representing Battered Immigrant Women and Children, CLEARINGHOUSE REv., May-June 2003, at 36,
36.
34. Violence Against Women & Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-162, § 104, 119 Stat. 2960, 2978-79 (2005).
35. Amy Farmer & Jill Tiefenthaler, Explaining the Recent Decline in Domestic Violence, 21
CONTEMP. EcoN. PoL'Y 158, 169 (2003).
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proceeding, for example, their resultant homelessness costs taxpayers in the
form of public services. 36 In New York City, the average cost of sheltering a
single homeless adult is $23,000 annually-far more than providing counsel to
prevent an eviction. 37 Medical and other costs rise, too, when individuals,
particularly senior citizens, lose their homes because they lack access to a
lawyer. When victims of domestic violence are unable to obtain help, the health
care, criminal justice, and social welfare systems bear the strain. 38 Employers,
too, suffer from decreased productivity and increased absenteeism. 39 Many of
these societal costs could be ameliorated if low-income individuals had access
to counsel to assist them in resolving their legal problems.
II.

THE PROMISE OF GIDEON V. WAINWRIGHT-LEGAL REPRESENTATION FOR

Low-INCOME PERSONS IN CRIMINAL MATTERS-IS LARGELY UNFULFILLED

In the 1963 landmark case of Gideon v. Wainwright, the Supreme Court
established that indigent criminal defendants have the right to an attorney, under
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, regardless of their
abilities to pay. 40 Yet notwithstanding the promise of Gideon, more than forty
years later the criminal justice system in many states is largely broken due to
inadequate funding of indigent defense services, crushing caseloads, and a lack
of oversight, supervision, and training of court-appointed defense counsel.
In 2003, in recognition of the fortieth anniversary of the Gideon decision, the
ABA conducted four hearings across the country to examine the quality and
consequences of indigent defense services in the nation. The ABA received
testimony from a broad range of experts, documenting a stunning array of
obstacles to enforcement of the Gideon right. The ABA's investigation culminated in publication of a report in 2004 titled Gideon's Broken Promise:
America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice. 41 Among the obstacles identified
by the experts were the following:

36. See NANCY SMITH ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY HOMELESSNESS IN NEW
YoRK CITY: AN IN-DEPl'H SrooY OF FAMll.lES' EXPERIENCES BEFORE AND AFTER SHELTER, § 3, at 13-14, 28
(2005) (finding that almost half of all families in the New York City homeless shelter system had
experienced an eviction in the five years preceding their admission to a shelter, and that being evicted
made it seven times more likely that a household would enter a shelter that same month).
37. Coalition for the Homeless, Research, Basic Facts about Homelessness, http://www.coalitionforthe
homeless.org/advocacy/basic_facts.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
38. See S. REP. No. 103-138, at 41 (1993) ("[E]stimates suggest that we spend $5 to $10 billion a
year on health care, criminal justice, and other social costs of domestic violence.").
39. See H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1839,
1853 ("[C]rimes of violence motivated by gender have a substantial adverse effect on interstate
commerce, by deterring potential victims from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in
interstate business, and from transacting with business, and in places involved, in interstate commerce ... [,] by diminishing national productivity, increasing medical and other costs, and decreasing
the supply of and the demand for interstate products . .. .").
40. 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963).
41. AM. BAR Ass'N STANDING CoMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE:
AMElucA' s CONI1NUING QuEsT FOR F.QuAL JUSTICE (2004) [hereinafter GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE].
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• The lack of adequate funding for indigent defense services, leading
to inadequate attorney compensation; lack of essential resources
(including expert, investigative, and support services); lack of training; reliance on various cost cutting measures; and resource disparity
between prosecution and indigent defense. 42
• ''Inadequate legal representation," including "meet 'em and plead 'em"
lawyers; incompetent and inexperienced lawyers; excessive caseloads;
lack of contact between defense counsel and clients (and lack of continuity
in representation of clients); lack of investigation, research, and zealous
advocacy by defense counsel; lack of conflict-free representation; and other
ethical violations by defense counsel.43
• "Structural defects in indigent defense systems," including insufficient independence of counsel from courts and prosecutors and an absence of oversight sufficient to ensure the provision of uniform, quality legal services.44
• Complete failure to provide counsel to those entitled to counsel: people
detained in jail without a lawyer; people encouraged to waive their right to
counsel and enter pleas of guilty; and counsel provided too late or not at
all.45

• A diverse range of additional problems, including inordinate delays in the
criminal justice process; a lack of full-time public defenders and of participation by the private bar; and a lack of data regarding indigent defense
systems.46
Problems virtually identical to those identified in the ABA report have been
the subject of numerous reports in many jurisdictions across the country,
extending back decades in time. 47 Most recently, the Chief Judge of the State of
New York, Judith S. Kaye, appointed a blue ribbon commission that, after
receiving testimony in a series of hearings, called for substantial reform of the
defense services provided in New York State. 48 As described in The New York
Times, the commission identified "such problems as overburdened defenders
who, in one county, average 1,000 misdemeanors and 175 felony cases in a
year, and 'grossly inadequate' financing." 49 The Commission further described

42. Id. at 7-14.
43. Id. at 14-20.
44. Id. at 20-22.
45. Id. at 22-26.
46. Id. at 26-28.
47. See id. at 7 n.39 (citing eight reports and articles from 1982 to 2004 on problems in indigent
defense systems).
48. See Danny Hakim, Judge Urges State Control of Legal Aid for the Poor, N.Y. TIMEs, June 29,
2006, at B 1. According to William E. Hellerstein, a professor at Brooklyn Law School and a
co-chairman of the commission, "Virtually every member of the commission has had long experience
in the criminal justice system." Hellerstein added: "I think it's fair to say that despite our experience,
we were somewhat taken aback by the depth and the extent of the crisis." Id.
49. Id.
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"wide disparities in counties' spending and in the resources available to prosecutors and defenders," and noted that "[t]he state lacks standards to define what it
means to provide adequate indigent defense and has no system for enforcing
such standards."50
The ABA report explains that inadequate defense lawyering is a cause of
wrongful convictions: "Although there undoubtedly are a variety of causes of
wrongful convictions-including police and prosecutorial misconduct, coerced
false confessions, eyewitness identification errors, lying informants-inadequate representation often is cited as a significant contributing factor." 51 The
report further quotes former Attorney General Janet Reno stating that,
[a] competent lawyer will skillfully cross-examine a witness and identify
and disclose a lie or a mistake. A competent lawyer will pursue weaknesses in
the prosecutor's case, both to test the basis for the prosecution and to
challenge the prosecutor's ability to meet the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
A competent lawyer will force a prosecutor to take a hard, hard look at the
gaps in the evidence . . . .
A competent lawyer will know how to conduct the necessary investigation
so that an innocent defendant is not convicted .. . .
In the end, a good lawyer is the best defense against wrongful conviction ... .52

The problem of wrongful convictions cannot be ignored. As of December 2006,
the Innocence Project, a legal clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law,
had identified 188 persons as having been wrongfully convicted of crimes, and
of having served more than 1000 years in prison as a result. 53 The discovery of
additional wrongful convictions has become an almost daily occurrence.
One example is Eddie Joe Lloyd, a mentally ill Michigan man who was
convicted of the 1984 rape and murder of a teenage girl. While residing in a
psychiatric hospital, Lloyd, who suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and mild
retardation, contacted police and made suggestions on how to solve this case
and others. The police interrogated Lloyd and told him that, if he confessed to
the murder, he would help them "smoke out" the real murderer. Lloyd then
50. Id.
51. GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 41 , at 3 n.25 (citing C. RONALD HUFF ET AL., CONVICTED
BUT INNOCENT: WRONGFUL CONVICDON AND PuBLIC POLICY 76-77 (1996); BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL
INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND 0rnER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 183-92
(2000); Norman Lefstein, In Search of Gideons Promise: Lessons from England and the Need for
Federal Help, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 835, 868 (2004)).
52. Janet Reno, Att' y Gen., Remarks at the National Symposium on Indigent Defense 2000 (June 29,
2000), in OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U .S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM ON INDIGENT DEFENSE
2000: REDEFINING LEADERSHIP FOR EQUAL JusTICE vi-vii (2000), quoted in GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE,
supra note 41, at 3.
53. See The Innocence Project Home Page, www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
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confessed to the crime in horrific detail by recounting facts fed to him by the
police. Lloyd's court-appointed attorney failed to challenge the coerced confession in court. As a result, Lloyd spent seventeen years in prison before being
exonerated by DNA evidence. Tragically, he died two years after his release
from prison. 54
When access to counsel in the criminal justice system is inadequate, society
suffers as well. Convicting Eddie Joe Lloyd and others of crimes they did not
commit enables the real perpetrators to remain at large. Moreover, taxpayers
must foot the bill for lengthy appeals processes and the high costs associated
with unnecessary and excessive incarceration.
Against a backdrop of rampant noncompliance with Gideon and the attendant
costs and consequences, it is encouraging to note that there are some signs of
real change. Across the country, reform initiatives are beginning to hold states
accountable under Gideon. The ABA report cites examples of successful initiatives in Georgia, Texas, and Virginia that have led to the creation of new
statewide defender systems with increased state funding and state oversight. 55
Additional reform efforts succeeded in Montana in 2005 and are underway in
Louisiana, Michigan, New York, and Pennsylvania.

III.

COURTS OFTEN ARE UNABLE

To PROVIDE ACCESS TO PEOPLE WITH

PHYSICAL

AND PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITIES

If the courts are to fulfill their essential role of protecting the most vulnerable
people in our society, then the most vulnerable people must be able to get into
court. People with physical and psychological impairments face unique challenges when attempting to vindicate their rights in court. Although the federal
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) aims to eradicate disability-based discrimination in a variety of settings, one threshold question is whether the courts
themselves are sufficiently accessible to enable individuals with disabilities to
enter courthouses and to participate in court proceedings.
Noncompliance with the ADA in state judicial systems has been widely
documented. 56 Surveys have found inaccessible courtrooms in California, Washington, Texas, New York, Tennessee, Missouri, and Florida. And, in some
jurisdictions, inaccessible courtrooms are the norm.57
The problems leading to this inaccessibility include:

• Architectural barriers: many people have difficulty navigating courthouse facilities, including parking lots and bathrooms, as well as
54. See Jodi Wilgoren, Confession Had His Signature; DNA Did Not, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2002, at
Al ; The Innocence Project: Eddie Joe Lloyd, http://www.innocenceproject.org/case/display_profile.
php?id= 110 (last visited Feb. 3, 2007).
55. See GIDEON'S BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 41, at 29-35 .
56. See Michael Waterstone, The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58
VAND. L. REV. I 807, 1857 (2005).
57. See id. at 1857-58.
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gaining access to assistive devices such as listening aids, print
enlargers, etc.
• Court practices: courts often impose inflexible scheduling requirements, including refusing to offer mid-morning or afternoon hearings
for persons who need extra time to get to court.
• Court officials: court personnel, including judges and clerks, may
lack sufficient knowledge to prevent misunderstandings and to avoid
reliance on mistaken stereotypes.
• Signage: Court signage may be inadequate, making it difficult to
obtain essential information, or to obtain assistance in completing
required forms. 58
For individuals with psychiatric impairments, analogous problems arise.
Individuals may be unable to handle the stress of courtroom proceedings, the
challenges of communicating with courthouse officials and judges, and the daily
effects of medications. 59
In 2004, the Supreme Court held in Tennessee v. Lane60 that individuals are
entitled to sue state court systems for their failure to comply with the ADA. 61
George Lane had sued Tennessee for failing to make the county courthouse
accessible to persons who rely on wheelchairs. Lane had been jailed after he
refused to crawl up the courthouse steps to attend a scheduled court appearance.62 The Court rejected Tennessee's argument that it was immune from suit
and held that Congress was within its power in enacting the ADA as a means of
protecting the constitutional right of access to the courts. 6 3
State court systems are cognizant of the need to address these problems. In a
memorandum responding to the Lane decision, the National Center on State
Courts identified forty-three court locations across the country where ADA
compliance activities were ongoing. 64 Additionally, the Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board (Access Board), an independent federal
agency devoted to accessibility for people with disabilities, has created a
Courthouse Access Advisory Committee to advise it on issues related to the
accessibility of courthouses covered under the ADA. These issues include best
practices, design solutions, promotion of accessible features, educational opportunities, and the gathering of information on existing barriers, practices, recom-

58. See Maryann Jones, And Access for All: Accommodating Individuals with Disabilities in the
California Courts, 32 U.S.F. L. REv. 75, 91-95 (1997).
59. See generally Jeanette Zelhof et al., Protecting the Rights of Litigants with Diminished Capacity
in the New York City Housing Courts, 3 CARDOZO PuB. L. PoL' Y & ETHICS J. 733 (2006).
60. 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
61. See id. at 533-34.
62. See id. at 514.
63. See id. at 518,531.
64. Memorandum from Jerry Kuban, Court Consulting Servs., Nat'! Center for State Courts,
Response/Reaction to Tennessee v. Lane (June 16, 2004), available at http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/
Publications/KIS_AmeDisResponseLanevTN.pelf.
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mendations, and guidelines. 65 Nevertheless, substantial work remains to make
courthouses more accessible to persons with disabilities.
IV.

COURTS OFTEN

Do NOT PROVIDE TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETING SERVICES
To SPEAK AND UNDERSTAND ENGLISH

TO PEOPLE WHO HAVE A LIMITED ABILITY

There is another particularly vulnerable segment of society-those people
with limited proficiency in English (often known as LEP individuals)-that is
frequently confronted with virtually insurmountable obstacles to accessing the
courts. LEP individuals often are unable to communicate with court personnel,
to conduct legal research, to read their opponents' legal papers, and to understand and participate in court proceedings.
A recent California study found that "courtroom language services [i.e.
interpreters] are virtually unavailable to many Californians."66 Most court
documents, such as standard pleadings, legal opinions, and self-help materials,
are written in English only, making them incomprehensible to LEP individuals. 67
In California alone, there are seven million people who cannot access the
courts without language assistance. 68 The practical consequences for the court
system are enormous. In Los Angeles County, approximately 10,000 proceedings each year are postponed because there is no interpreter available. 69 These
problems are particularly acute in rural areas, where often there is no certified
interpreter available to speak the necessary language. 70 When no interpreter can
be found at all, judges must attempt to reach a fair and accurate decision
knowing that they cannot communicate with one or more of the litigants. For
this reason, the Judicial Council of California recently called the participation of
interpreters in domestic violence proceedings "a fundamental factor contributing to the quality of justice."71
These problems generally stem from the courts' inadequate resources. Responding to the conclusion of the California Access to Justice Commission that
California's courts generally failed to provide access to LEP individuals, the
Chief Justice of the California Supreme Court, Ronald George, said that he did
not perceive "any immediate prospect" of obtaining funds to alleviate the

65. See generally Courthouse Advisory Committee Home Page, http://www.access-board.gov/caac/
index.htm (last visited Dec. 20, 2006).
66. CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, LANGUAGE BARRIERS TO JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 9 (2005),
available at http://calbar.ca.gov/calbar/pdfs/reports/2005_Language-Barriers_Report.pdf.
67. See id. at 18.
68. Id. at 1 n.2.
69. Id. at 23.
70. See, e.g., N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYs., CouRT INTERPRETING IN NEW YoRK: A PLAN OF ACTION 1
(2006), available at http://www.courts.state.ny.us/courtinterpreter/action_plan.pdf.
71. ADMIN. OFFICE OF TIIE COURTS, JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CAL., FAMILY LAW INTERPRETER PILOT
PROGRAM: REPoRT TO TIIE LEGISLATURE 2 (2001), available at www.courtinfo.ca.gov/prograrns/cfcc/pdffiles/
FLIPP.PDF.
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problem. 72 The complicated logistics of providing language access contributes
to the problem. In New York State alone, litigants speak 168 different languages
and many more dialects. 73 Courts must ensure that the interpreters appearing in
their courts are competent. Court interpreters must be proficient not only in the
two languages they are translating between, but also in the legal terminology of
each language. Unfortunately, in many instances, even when court interpreters
are available they lack the requisite proficiency and provide incorrect translations. 74
V.

COURTS HAVE

HAD THEIR JURISDICTION STRIPPED AND ARE LESS AVAILABLE

THAN EVER To HEAR CERTAIN CATEGORIES

OF CASES

The last two decades have witnessed a substantial narrowing of the scope of
the courts' authority to enforce laws when individual litigants raise claims of
unlawful conduct by the government. The effects of this eroded jurisdiction are
widespread and long lasting. Principles and expectations are established that can
affect the development of the law in related areas for years to come.
Some of the retrenchment is a product of the Supreme Court's own decisions.
Under the banner of the so-called "new federalism," the Court has declared that
the federal government lacks sufficient constitutional power to authorize some
suits against the states for civil rights violations. These decisions have limited
the ability of the disabled and senior citizens to seek redress against state
employers for discrimination75 and have provided a rationale that more broadly
threatens the continued enforcement of federal civil rights against the states.
Other Supreme Court decisions have ruled that individuals may not bring claims
to enforce civil rights either because the statute did not explicitly authorize such
a claim76 or because such claims were not sufficiently related to Congress's
constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. 77
Other limitations result from actions of the executive or legislative branches.
We highlight below several particular contexts in which the executive or
legislative branches have stripped courts of the power to hear claims: the War

72. Claire Cooper, Interpreter Shortage Leaves Courts in a Bind, SACRAMENTO BEE, Sept. 8, 2005, at
Al (quoting State Chief Justice Ronald George).
73. N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT Svs., supra note 70, at 1.
74. See CAL. COMM'N ON ACCESS TO JUSTICE, supra note 66, at 17-18, 22-23.
75. See, e.g., Garrett v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (sharply circumscribing
the ability of the disabled to bring claims against state employers under the ADA); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (similarly limiting the ability of senior citizens to sue state employers for
damages under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
76. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 293 (2001) (holding that private individuals could not
bring claims under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits race- and national
origin-based discrimination, under a "disparate impact" theory, and could bring claims only under the
much harder to prove intentional discrimination theory).
77. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-19 (2000) (holding that Congress was not
authorized under the Commerce Clause to create a private remedy for victims of gender-motivated
violence to sue in civil court).
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on Terror, immigrants' access to the courts, and the ability of prisoners to
challenge the conditions of their confinement.
These limitations on the courts' power are, of course, of particular concern to
immigrants, prisoners, and those charged as terrorists. But the ultimate effects
of these limitations will reach much further. The judicial branch is charged with
protecting the most vulnerable in our society, who often cannot assert their
rights through the political process. Consequently, the weakening of the Judiciary through the War on Terror, the assault on immigrants' rights, and the
Prison Litigation Reform Act threatens not only the direct targets of each action,
but also everyone who turns to the Judiciary to protect their rights when the
political process fails to do so.
A. THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH HAS SOUGHT TO REDUCE THE FUNCTION OF THE COURTS IN

REVIEWING THE GOVERNMENT'S CONDUCT IN THE WAR ON TERROR

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. military, the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and allied nations have engaged in counterterrorism operations and detained hundreds, perhaps thousands, of individuals
without the threshold of a lawful process to determine the factual or legal bases
for detention. Although detainees have been tagged "the worst of the worst" by
senior executive branch officials, a substantial number appear to have been
incorrectly detained. During "Operation Enduring Freedom" in Afghanistan, for
example, the military did not conduct hearings to determine whether the Afghans swept up during the conflict (and handed in for $5000 bounties) were
properly characterized as enemies. 78
Often illiterate, without English language skills or experience with any legal
system, these detainees have had no meaningful opportunity to demonstrate
innocence, and few advocates to protest their improper detention. Detainees
have been held in the Naval Brig at Charleston, South Carolina, 79 Guantanamo
Bay Cuba, 80 and secret CIA-run "black sites" scattered around the world. 81
Coercive interrogations, rising to levels widely recognized as torture, have been
confirmed at many of these overseas detention sites. 82 The Bush Administration

78. See generally_ JosEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PREsIDENTIAL POWER (2006);
DAVID RosE, GUANTANAMO: THE WAR ON HUMAN RIGHTS 13-22, 33-41 (2004); Tim Golden, Administration Officials Split Over Stalled Military Tribunals, N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 25, 2004, at Al ; Tim Golden &
Don van Natta, Jr., U.S. Said to Overstate Value of Guantanamo Detainees, N.Y. TIMEs, June 21, 2004,
at Al.
79. See Al-Marri v. Hanft, 378 F. Supp. 2d 673 (D.S.C. 2005).
80. See In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443 (D.D.C. 2005) (mem.).
81. See Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons; Debate ls Growing Within Agency
About Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH. PosT, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al ;
Dana Priest & Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations; 'Stress and Duress '
Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities, WASH. PosT, Dec. 26, 2002, at
Al.
82. See generally MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH : AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON
TERROR (2004).
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holds detainees as presidentially designated "enemy combatants"-a category now
applied without precedent in modem military operations or international law. 83
Protecting physical liberty against executive detention historically has been at
the heart of the Judiciary's role. 84 As Supreme Court Justice David Souter
recently explained, "[f]or reasons of inescapable human nature, the branch of
Government asked to counter a serious threat is not the branch on which to rest
the Nation's entire reliance in striking the balance between the will to win and
the cost in liberty on the way to victory." 85 But the administration has fiercely
resisted any and all judicial oversight of detention operations, arguing that even
U.S. citizens detained in the United States as "enemy combatants" are entitled
to only minimal due process, and certainly not to an opportunity to examine and
challenge the legal and factual bases for their detention. 86
Justice Souter's insight is confirmed by journalistic reports of the principles
of counterterrorism decisionmaking that have been recently adopted. According
to one journalist, the Administration has acted on the principle that "a one
percent chance of a catastrophe must be treated 'as certainty,"' with preventative action taken accordingly. 87 Unsurprisingly, this approach has yielded an
overwhelming proportion of false positives among detainees, rendering the need
for judicial oversight more pressing. Moreover, international condemnation of
American detention and interrogation practices is damaging counterterrorism
efforts. 88 Given these trends, judicial review for both domestic and at least some
offshore facilities appears to be increasingly likely.
A tangle of thorny legal questions, however, obscures the proper venue and
scope of judicial review in these detention cases. Essentially, there are three
pivotal legal questions raised by detainee policy. First, what is the legal regime
that governs interdiction and detention operations under counterterrorism auspices: Is it some part of the law of war, 89 or is it the civilian criminal law?90

83. See In re Guantanamo, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 450 (defining "enemy combatant") (quoting Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense regarding Order Establishing Combatant Status Review
Tribunal to the Secretary of the Navy (July 7, 2004), available at http://defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/
d20040707review.pdt). See generally Major Richard B. Baxter, So-Called "Un-privileged Belligerency": Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 323, 340 (1951); W. Thomas Mallison
& Sally V. Mallison, The Juridical Status of Irregular Combatants Under the International Humanitarian Law ofArmed Conflict, 9 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 39 (1977).
84. See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (preventing
suspension of habeas corpus except "in cases of rebellion or invasion").
85. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 545 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part,
and concurring in the judgment).
86. See generally Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696).
87. RON SUSKIND, THE ONE PERCENT DOCTRINE: DEEP INSIDE AMERICA'S PuRsurr OF ITS ENEMIES SINCE
9/11, at 150 (2006).
88. Cf Aziz Huq, Extraordinary Rendition and the Wages of Hypocrisy, 23 WORLD PoL'Y J. 25,
28-32 (2006) (discussing the foreign policy consequences of extraordinary rendition).
89. For an examination of the law of war related to detention issues, see generally MICHAEL BYERS,
WAR LAW: UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ARMED CONFLICT 127-35 (2006).
90. But see BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEmRE nm NEXT ATTACK: PR!lsERVING CJvn. LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF ThRRORISM 13--72 (2<ni) (criticizing the dichotomy between "war" and "criminal" approaches to counterterrorism).
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And, if the law of war applies, which laws-specifically, which parts of the
1949 Geneva Conventions-govem?91 Second, if a detainee falls outside the
ambit of the criminal law and is detained either here or overseas, can federal
courts hear challenges to detention, and, if so, how can they do so effectively?
Finally, when a person is properly detained under the laws of war, especially
outside areas that traditionally would have been designated as battlefields, what
process ought properly be used to determine whether that person is guilty of a
criminal offense? A trilogy of Supreme Court cases in 200492 and a fourth case
decided in June 200693 have cast light on some of these issues, but much
remains unclear.
On the first question, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld the Supreme Court concluded that
individuals detained on a foreign battlefield bearing arms against the United
States are properly subject to the laws of war. 94 Application of the laws of war
means that an "enemy combatant" detained on the battlefield may be detained
for the length of the relevant territorial conflict. 95 Hamdi left open the very
important question of whether the "enemy combatant" designation could be
extended beyond the battlefield context. Further, in the 2006 Hamdan case, the
Court held that all detainees are entitled to the protections of Common Article 3
of the Geneva Conventions, which guarantees, among other things, that sentences and executions can be carried out only upon "previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples."96 The laws of war,
including some parts of the Geneva Conventions, thus apply to foreign battlefield captures. 97
Second, courts to date have rejected executive branch arguments that the
judicial branch must refrain from exercising jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme
Court rejected government arguments that the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base is
beyond judicial ken. 98 One district court has also concluded that jurisdiction
obtains when the United States collaborates with another sovereign. 99 Once

91. See Derek Jinks & David Sloss, ls the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 97, 124-29 (2004) (discussing the extent to which the Geneva Conventions are
self-executing).
92. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Rumsfeld v.
Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
93. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
94. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518-19 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
95. In Hamdi, the relevant territorial conflict was the ground war in Afghanistan. See id. at 518, 521.
96. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795 (quoting Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135).
97. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516-20 (plurality opinion); see also Padilla v. Hanft, 126 S. Ct. 1649,
1649 (2006) (mem.) (declining certiorari review to petition from "enemy combatant" detained in
United States).
98. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004).
99. See Abu Ali v. Aschroft, 350 F. Supp. 2d 28, 59-61 (D.D.C. 2004) (explaining that the United
States does not evade liability for constitutional violations by acting in collaboration with foreign
government).
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jurisdiction is established, however, how challenges to the factual and legal
bases of detention can and should be brought remains unclear. Citizen detainees
are at least entitled to a judicial hearing to ascertain whether they are in fact
"enemy combatants." 100 Hamdi gave some clues to the form procedures might
take. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether Hamdi-compliant hearings have yet
been convened, and the precise form of such hearings has yet to be definitively
defined by the Judiciary. 101 Much rests on the precise quanta of fact-finding
permitted in challenges to government accusations of terrorist activity.
Finally, the Hamdan Court held that military commissions established to
determine guilt or innocence of war crimes charges were invalid and that such
commissions must comport with procedural standards established by the Uniform Code of Military Justice and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.102
These cases leave much undecided. Procedures to determine "enemy combatant" status, as well as the scope of that term, remain unclear. The aforementioned cases also focused on the fact of detention, not the conditions of
detention. After the Court in Hamdi affirmed detainees' right to counsel, issues
concerning conditions of detention have largely been addressed in the context of
requests by lawyers for access to their clients. Although Congress could step in
and usefully clarify these questions, one intervention in December 2005 was a
manifest moral and practical failure. 103 That law purported to curtail federal
court jurisdiction over actions arising out of Guantanamo and reflected a
factually inaccurate premise that habeas litigation out of Guantanamo was
similar to frivolous prison conditions challenges. 104 The legislation was construed narrowly in Hamdan. 105
Even if Congress does not act, the federal courts have ample resources to
determine the propriety of initial detentions, and the military justice system has
the ability to hold war crimes trials safely and fairly. 106 The optimal solution to
the detention thicket thus is one that has been staring the nation in the face all
along: employing the federal courts' and their military counterparts' longrespected capacity to mete out equitable and procedurally fair justice that will
be respected around the world.
Yet, not long before this Essay went to print, Congress approved and the

100. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536--37 (plurality opinion).
101. See id. at 538; In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 465-78 (D.D.C. 2005)
(mem.).
102. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2797 (2006) (Stevens, J. , plurality opinion). See
generally Neal K. Katya! & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military
Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259 (2002) (exploring the constitutionality of military tribunals).
103. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, §§ 1001--06, 119 Stat. 2680,
2739-44.
104. See id. § 1005(c), 119 Stat. at 2742.
105. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2765--69.
106. See generally SERRIN ThRNER & STEPHEN J. ScHULHOFER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JusncE AT NYU
Sett. OF LAw, THE SECRECY PROBLEM IN ThRRoRISM TRIALs (2005).
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President signed a far-reaching omnibus measure addressing the scope of
detention authority, the kinds of tactics that could be used in interrogations, and
the scope of post-hoc judicial review. Entitled the Military Commissions Act of
2006 (MCA), 107 this Act purported to respond to Hamdan but in fact swept
much further. With respect to access to the federal courts, the MCA professes to
eliminate jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions filed by or on behalf of
noncitizens designated as "enemy combatants" by the Executive. 108 The Administration has argued that a noncitizen assigned the vague designation of "awaiting determination" as an "enemy combatant" is also covered by this habeasstripping provision 109-suggesting that the Administration's intent is to detain
individuals without designating them "enemy combatants." If the government
prevails, neither detainees at Guantanamo nor noncitizens swept up and detained as "enemy combatants" in the American heartland will have any meaningful opportunity to challenge the factual or legal basis of their detention by
habeas corpus. The MCA further purports to eliminate all other actions that an
alien "enemy combatant" might bring in federal court, 110 leaving open the
possibility that victims of torture, or other abusive interrogation measures,
would have no civil remedy in a U.S. court.
B. THE GOVERNMENT HAS SOUGHT TO REDUCE THE ROLE OF THE COURTS IN
REVIEWING DECISIONS APPLYING IMMIGRATION LAW

Judicial review has long played an important role in immigration law and
remains an important safeguard of individual rights against the misuse of
government power. During the past decade, however, the government has
repeatedly attempted to restrict immigrants' access to the courts. Moreover,
various jurisdiction-stripping provisions have been coupled with measures rendering even long-term residents deportable for minor infractions, emphasizing
security at any cost. Although the Supreme Court has helped preserve judicial
review, access to the courts has decreased and remains vulnerable to future
limitations.
In 1996, Congress enacted two statutes that sought to significantly restrict
immigrants' access to the federal courts: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act (AEDPA) 111 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (IIRIRA). 112 AEDPA, passed in response to the Oklahoma
City bombing of 1995, contained many anti-immigrant provisions (though the

107. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
108. Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7(a). Thus far, one district court has agreed with the
government and upheld the MCA's repeal of habeas jurisdiction over the petitions of Guantanamo
detainees. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-1519 (JR), 2006 WL 3625015, at *9 (D.D.C. Dec. 13,
2006).
109. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 WL 3625015, at *I.
ll0. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 950j(b), 120 Stat. at 2623-24.
lll. Pub. L. No. 104-132, ll0 Stat. 1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA] .
ll2. Pub. L. No. 104-208, ll0 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) [hereinafter IIRIRA].
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attack was the work of homegrown terrorists), including limits on judicial
review. 113 IIRIRA, enacted several months after AEDPA, contained additional
anti-immigrant measures. It not only eliminated court review over administrative deportation decisions for noncitizens convicted of most criminal offenses,
but also curtailed the availability of important forms of relief from deportation
that took into account individual circumstances. 114 These provisions, moreover,
were applied retroactively, thus penalizing noncitizens for minor infractions
committed decades before without any independent review or individualized
assessment of their claims. 115 In addition, the IIRIRA provided for the creation
of a new "expedited removal" process which summarily turns away asylum
seekers arriving at America's shores. 116 As human rights groups have documented, the "expedited removal" process has allowed the government to deny
entry to people fleeing persecution without making an independent assessment
of their claims. 117
The Supreme Court's 2001 decision in INS v. St. Cyr 118 reaffirmed the
importance of judicial review in immigration cases. The Court held that AEDPA
and IIRIRA did not eliminate federal habeas corpus review over deportation
orders 11 9 and that restrictions on relief from deportation did not apply retroactively to cases pending before the statutes' enactments. 12 Further demonstrating
the importance of judicial review, the Court ruled in another case that term that
the INS could not indefinitely detain noncitizens in the United States. 121 St.
Cyr's importance has reverberated beyond immigration law, providing an important precedent for federal court review of the executive detention of individuals
at Guantanamo Bay after September 11th. 122
However, court decisions have neither resolved all limits on judicial review
nor ended the push for further restrictions. The terrorist attacks of September
11th prompted the dissolution of the Immigration and Naturalization Service
and its replacement with the Department of Homeland Security, 123 which has
placed even greater emphasis on security at the expense of court access for

°

113. See AEDPA §§ 401-43.
114. See IIRIRA tit. III, §§ 301-88 (Inspection, Apprehension, Detention, Adjudication, and Removal of Inadmissible and Deportable Aliens).
115. See RONALD WEICH, ACLU, UPSETTING CHECKS AND BALANCES: CONGRESSIONAL HOSTILITY Tow ARD THE COURTS IN TIMES OF CRISIS 30 (2001) (citing the example of a mother of two who was deported
for a previous conviction of shoplifting fifteen dollars of merchandise when she tried to return baby
clothes without a receipt, notwithstanding her pending application for citizenship and steady work
history).
116. See IIRIRA § 302(a).
117. See, e.g., LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Is THis AMERICA? THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS ro
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES (2000).
118. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
119. See id. at 308-14.
120. See id. at 315, 326.
121. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699-700 (2001).
122. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466,474 (2004) (relying on St. Cyr).
123. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2205.
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asylum seekers and other immigrants. 124 In addition, streamlining regulations
adopted in August 2002 125 weakened the system of internal administrative
review of immigration judge decisions by the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), decreasing the BIA's size by over half, making disposition of appeals by
a single BIA member (rather than a panel of three) the norm, and encouraging
the issuance of opinions without analysis of the claims. 126 The regulations have
increased pressure on federal appeals courts and helped prompt calls for further
limits on judicial review even though, as Judge Richard Posner of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit suggested last year, such review
is necessary to correct the BIA's "staggering" error rate. 127
In 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which eliminated one of the
ways in which immigrants adjudged deportable could seek court review of the
BIA's decisions. 128 Recently proposed legislation threatens to further undermine
immigrants' access to the courts by imposing procedural obstacles to meaningful consideration of removal decisions and by restricting review of denials of
citizenship petitions. 129
In sum, while Congress and the Executive have broad powers to set U.S.
immigration policy, 130 federal courts play an important role in ensuring that
this power is exercised in accordance with the nation's laws and the Constitution.131 Preserving immigrants' access to the courts thus safeguards both
individual liberty and the separation of powers against unlawful government
action.
C. THE FUNCTION OF THE COURTS IN REVIEWING CLAIMS OF PRISONERS CHALLENGING
THE CONDITIONS OF IMPRISONMENT HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY CIRCUMSCRIBED

In 1996, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 132 in an
attempt to reduce the volume of prison conditions cases reaching the federal
courts. Underlying the law were the beliefs that the courts were being clogged
by prison conditions cases, that most of the cases were frivolous, and that the
reason so many cases were being brought was that prisoners have too much
time on their hands.

124. See, e.g., Karen C. Tumlin, Suspect First: How Terrorism Policy ls Reshaping Immigration
Policy, 92 CAL. L. REv. 1173, 1190, 1228 (2004) (describing the adverse impact on asylum seekers).
125. See 8 C.F.R. § 3 (2005).
126. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law and Federal Court Jurisdiction Through the Lens of
Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 459, 474-75 (2006).
127. Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 829 (7th Cir. 2005).
128. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, § 106, 119 Stat. 231, 310-11 ; Motomura, supra
note 126, at 486-88.
129. See Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4437,
109th Cong. § 609 (2005).
130. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
131. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941--42 (1983).
132. Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (1996) (codified in scattered
sections of 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C., and 42 U.S.C.).
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The PLRA contained a number of separate measures aimed at reducing the
volume of prison litigation, three of which we will mention here: 133
• a reduction in the amount of attorneys' fees available to attorneys
representing prisoners in conditions cases;
• a requirement that prisoners exhaust all available internal grievance
procedures (regardless of how strict or cumbersome those procedures
are) prior to filing a federal lawsuit; and
• a requirement that prisoners who have had three cases dismissed as
lacking in merit, frivolous, or malicious pay the full filing fee in all
future cases, regardless of their ability to pay.
The PLRA has achieved its goal of reducing the quantity of prison litigation
in the federal courts, but at high cost. 134 The high number of prison conditions
cases had stemmed from a number of factors. First, all aspects of a prisoner's
life are under the control of prison authorities, and prisoners have very few
ways of influencing the conditions of their confinement other than litigation
(they generally cannot, for example, vote). 135 Second, it is not uncommon for
prisoners to suffer serious violations of their constitutional rights, including rape
and other violence by prisoners and prison personnel. 136 The sharp rise in the
prison population in the past few decades was also a major factor underlying the
rise in prisoner litigation. 137 Finally, prisoners were perceived as having unlimited time to pursue lawsuits (even though many also refrained from pursuing
legitimate claims out of fear of retaliation by prison authorities).
The available data indicates that the PLRA has made it more difficult-and in
some cases impossible-for prisoners to bring meritorious lawsuits. For ex-

133. In addition to the provisions discussed here, there are several other provisions of the PLRA.
Two that have been particularly criticized as interfering with the power of the courts are a provision
barring prisoners from seeking damages for mental and emotional injuries in the absence of physical
injuries, and another provision sharply limiting the conditions under which federal courts can enter
consent decrees in prison conditions cases. See generally John Boston, The Prison Litigation Reform
Act: The New Face of Court Stripping, 67 BROOK. L. REv. 429 (2001).
134. According to a recent study, in the four years following the PLRA's enactment, federal civil
lawsuits by prisoners dropped by forty percent. Brian J. Ostrom et al., Congress, Courts and Corrections: An Empirical Perspective on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 78 NO'I"RE DAME L. REv. 1525,
1525-26 (2003).
135. See Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, ll6 HARV. L. REv. 1555, 1574 (2003) (citing Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 4ll U.S. 475,492 (1973)).
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 15601(2), (13) (Supp. III 2003) (finding that "experts have conservatively
estimated that at least 13 percent of the inmates in the United States have been sexually assaulted in
prison," and that the rapes involve "actual and potential violations of the United States Constitution");
Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. ll46, ll60-61 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (discussing the "tremendous potential
for abuse" of prisoners in prison, and finding that, in one particular California prison, there has been "a
conspicuous pattern of excessive force"); Joyce Kosak, Comment, Mental Health Treatment and
Mistreatment in Prison, 32 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 389, 399-404 (2005) (describing the pervasive
failure of prisons to provide constitutionally adequate mental health treatment).
137. See Schlanger, supra note 135, at 1586-87.
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ample, the exhaustion requirement has operated to bar prisoners from challenging injuries received in prison merely because those injuries sent them to the
hospital during the entire short period during which they could have filed a
grievance. 138 The attorneys' fee award provision, together with a ban on prisoner representation by all lawyers receiving any federal LSC funding, has made
it impossible for most prisoners to find legal representation, thereby sharply
reducing their chances of prevailing in meritorious cases. 139 It thus appears that
the PLRA took an overly blunt approach to the task of curbing frivolous
litigation, with the result that a highly vulnerable and disempowered prison
population is now less able to obtain court protection than ever.
VI. THE INCREASED RELIANCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLlJTION METHODS
RAISES NEW CONCERNS

The courts need not be understood as the exclusive forum for the enforcement of laws or resolution of disputes. Litigation can be prohibitively expensive, complex, and time-consuming. Presumably, there could and should be less
expensive, faster, and no less fair systems for resolving disputes pursuant to the
rule of law. At the very least, there is a need to simplify litigation. Alternative
dispute resolution systems, such as mediation and arbitration, appear to offer
one such opportunity. 140
In fact, courts offer litigants the opportunity to participate in mediation
proceedings as an option prior to proceeding with full litigation, and some also
offer binding arbitration as an alternative to litigation. But the private nature of
these proceedings, compared to litigation, which is public in nature and creates
a public record, has generated concern. Decisions are made without the sanitizing effects of public scrutiny. Moreover, the law itself, which in the normal
course would evolve to reflect the decisions made in litigation, does not have
the opportunity to change and develop in response to outcomes and insights
developed off the record. 141
Distinct from these court-affiliated alternatives to litigation is the increased
inclusion of binding arbitration clauses-promises made by individuals that
they will not sue in court but rather submit any dispute for resolution by a
private arbitration organization-in a broad range of contracts. In many contexts, including consumer contracts and employment agreements, 142 binding

138. Id. at 1653-54 & n.332.
139. See id. at 1654-57.
140. See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Our Couns, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Movement is Re-Shaping our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REv. 165 (2003) (providing a
history of the development of alternative dispute resolution methodologies).
141. See id. at 187.
142. It has been estimated that as of 2002, about ten to twenty percent of the workforce was covered
by a mandatory arbitration agreement. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary
Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90
CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1209 (2002) (citing Charlie Cray, See you in . . . Arbitration?, MULTINAT'L MONITOR,
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arbitration clauses prohibit recourse to the courts. 143
Such arbitration requirements have been shown to be problematic for a
variety of reasons. First, low-income people typically have little negotiating
leverage when entering into agreements with employers, credit card companies,
and many other entities. They cannot realistically expect to alter the terms of
such clauses or decline to agree to them. 144 Second, the substantial administrative costs of arbitration processes may and generally do exceed those of the civil
court system. 145 Third, arbitration agreements increasingly include mandatory
collective action waivers. These provisions prohibit individuals from joining
forces to advance their claims together through class action litigation, even
though such collective action sometimes offers the best and most efficient
option for recovery (particularly if the sum due is not so substantial as to induce
any individual to proceed alone). 146 Fourth, in many contexts, arbitrators have
been shown to develop a bias in favor of so-called repeat players. 147 Finally, as
noted above, arbitration clauses are designed to preclude appeal to the courts.
When binding arbitration agreements lead to unjust results, there is little
opportunity to set them aside. Under the Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Federal Arbitration Act, the scope of a court's review of such agreements is
generally restricted to the narrow question of whether the arbitration provision
Dec. l , 2000, at 4; David E. Feller, Putting Gilmer Where it Belongs: The FAA s Labor Exemption, 18
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 253, 253 (2000)).
143. A recent study of 161 businesses across 37 industries from which consumers make expensive or
ongoing purchases found that 35.4% of those businesses included mandatory arbitration clauses in their
consumer contracts. Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, "Volunteering" to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumers Experience, 67 LAW & CoNTEMP. PRoas. 55,
62 (2004). The study found use of arbitration agreements in each of the following categories: Home
Repair/Remodeling, Homeowners' Insurance, Apartment Rental, Renters' Insurance, Real Estate, Internet Service, Online Retail, Auto Purchase/Lease, Gas Card, Auto Insurance, Health Insurance, Health
Club, Tour Operator, Credit Card (general, airline, store), Banking, Investments, Accountant/fax
Consultant, Attorney, and Cellular Telephone. Id. at 63 tbl. 2.
144. See generally Mark E. Budnitz, The High Cost of Mandatory Consumer Arbitration, 67 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoas. 133 (2004); Julia A. Scarpino, Mandatory Arbitration of Consumer Disputes: A
Proposal to Ease the Financial Burden on Low-Income Consumers, IO AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. PoL'Y &
L. 679 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33.
145. See Pua. CITIZEN, THE CosTS OF ARBITRATION 42-51 (2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/
documents/ACF! IOA.PDF.
146. See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the
Modem Class Action, 104 M1cH. L. REv. 373, 378 (2005) (citing David Rosenberg, Decoupling
Deterrence and Compensation Functions in Mass Tort Class Actions for Future Loss, 88 VA. L. REv.
1871, 1906 n.62 (2002), and arguing that class actions serve the important role of aggregating small
claims). These collective action waivers also serve as a bar to collective action in the arbitration
context, precluding individuals from aggregating their claims in that forum as well. See Demaine &
Hensler, supra note 143, at 66 (stating that just over thirty percent of surveyed arbitration clauses
precluded collective action in arbitration proceedings). Courts have generally upheld these collective
action waivers. See Gilles, supra, at 400 nn.137 & 139 (surveying state and federal court decisions
regarding the unconscionability of arbitration provisions that waive class action rights).
147. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP.
PoL'Y J. 189, 205-10 (1997) (finding that employers who are repeat players at arbitration do better in
arbitration than employers who arbitrate only once).
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itself, as contrasted with the broader substantive contract terms, was obtained by
fraud, duress, or unconscionability. 148 This is an extremely high threshold for a
party seeking court review to meet.
CONCLUSION

To stabilize our courts, assure their independence, and secure meaningful
access so that all the members of our society can resolve their critical legal
needs, a commitment is required by all of us. Inadequate access to the courts
harms the court system itself and the citizenry's respect for the rule of law.
When segments of the public believe that the courts are unfair to the poor, or
that the courts treat communities of color with hostility, the courts lose legitimacy. Not only do courts suffer as institutions, but the nation's promise of
"equal justice for all" is broken. As the Supreme Court has stated, "[t]here can
be no equal justice where the kind of trial a inan gets depends on the amount of
money he has." 149 The following specific reform initiatives aim to address and
correct this fundamental problem:
Provide essential funding for the federal Legal Services Corporation. The
ABA has recommended that LSC requires $495 million for fiscal year 2007. 150
That is the minimum that should be provided.
Remove federal restrictions that apply to the Legal Services Corporation
and its grantees, including the restrictions that encumber non-federal
funds. These funding restrictions undercut effective representation of lowincome clients by lawyers in programs that receive LSC funding.
Ensure access to counsel in civil cases in which basic human needs are at
stake. In a formal resolution adopted unanimously in August 2006, the ABA
urges governmental authorities at all levels to provide counsel to low-income
individuals in important civil cases, including those in which shelter, sustenance, safety, health, or child custody are at issue. 151 Other nations have
recognized that it is vital either to provide counsel or to simplify procedures and
substantive law to the point where counsel is not necessary. The United States
needs to do more in both areas.
Authorize appropriate awards of attorneys' fees so that civil rights suits
will not be discouraged. Our federal and state governments need to adopt
policies that authorize appropriate awards of attorneys' fees sufficient to enable
low-income people to obtain qualified counsel to represent them in claims to
enforce their civil legal rights and promote the rule of law.

148. See, e.g., Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 126 S. Ct. 1204, 1209 (2006).
149. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
150. LSC Funding Request for 2007, DIALOGUE, Winter 2006, at 1, 23, available at http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/dia1ogue/downloads/dialogue2006win.pdf.
151. AM. BAR Ass'N, REPORT ro THE HousE OF DELEGATES No. 112A (2006), available at http://
www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A 112A. pdf.
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Provide essential funding and superv1s10n for state indigent defense
services. The promise of Gideon v. Wainwright has been deferred for too long.
Our states need to ensure that low-income persons charged with crimes receive
defense counsel who are adequately financed, properly trained and supervised,
and accountable to appropriate practice standards.
Guarantee access to the courts for people with disabilities. The ADA
promises access to public buildings, including the courts. We need a national
commitment by federal and state governments to finance meaningful access for
people with physical and psychiatric disabilities to all of our nation's courtrooms.
Guarantee access to the courts for people with limited English proficiency. People who are learning English are also entitled to equal justice, and
the society and the courts are better off when laws are enforced evenly and
disputes resolved pursuant to the rule of law. We need our federal government
and state governments to commit sufficient resources to ensure that translation
and interpretation services make it possible for all members of our society to
participate equally in court proceedings.
Correct the excesses of court-stripping. Too many people are denied access
to the courts by judicial decisions and laws that limit the jurisdiction of the
courts. We need our courts, and our elected leaders, to appreciate the destabilizing consequences of rules that place the courts out of reach of the most
vulnerable members of our society.
Control the excesses of alternative dispute resolution requirements. Although alternatives to litigation are desirable, new problems can be created by
policies that favor private mediation or promote the complete waiver of litigation rights. We need to examine the societal consequences for the rule of law of
taking disputes out of our public courts and promoting their resolution by
non-judges in private settings. Where binding arbitration is authorized, we need
to be sure that the terms are fair, that the decisionmakers are unbiased, and that
judicial resolution remains available when necessary to preserve justice.

